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 إهــــــــــــــــــــداء
 
ٗاىذي حفظٌٖ الله ٗسػبٌٕ ىصجشٌٕ ٗ دػبئٌٖ ٗ رطدٍؼٌٖ   إىىإٔذي ٕزا اىؼَو اىَز٘اظغ 
ٗ ٍَٖب ػَيذ فيِ , ٗىَب قذٍبٓ ىً ٍِ خٖذ ٗ دػٌ ٍبدي ٍٗؼْ٘ي ٍز٘اصو خلاه ٍسٍشرً اىؼيٍَخ
ٌيجسٌٖ ربج  أُاسأه الله اىؼظٌٍ سة اىؼشش اىؼظٌٍ  ,ٗى٘ ثبىدضء اىٍسٍش ٍَب قذٍبٓ أفً أُاسزؽٍغ 
صٗخزً  إىى ٗالأٍوٌْج٘ع اىصجش  إىىإٔذٌخ  مَب   .ؼبػزٌٖ ٗ ثشٌٕ إىىاىصحخ ٗاىؼبفٍخ ٗ أُ ٌ٘فقًْ 
 .ضدٍغ ٗاىذػبءأخ٘ارً ٗ إخ٘اًّ ىذػٌَٖ ىً ثبىذ إىى ٗ هػجذ اىديً أً
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ABSTRACT 
Anas A. Al-Roubaiey 
King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, 2009 
 
A mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) is an infrastructureless network consisting of 
self-configuring mobile nodes connected by wireless links. Because of its decentralized 
property, these nodes relay on each other to store and forward packets. Most of the 
proposed MANET protocols assume cooperative and friendly network context, and do 
not address security issues.  Furthermore, MANETs are highly vulnerable for passive and 
active attacks because of their open medium, rapidly changing topology, lack of 
centralized monitoring.  The encryption and authentication solutions, which are 
considered as the first line of defense, are not sufficient to protect MANETs. Therefore, 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are needed to be the second line of defense to protect 
the network from such security problems. Many of the current IDSs for MANETS based 
on the Watchdog technique. In this research we study the behavior of this technique and 
propose a novel mechanism, which named as Adaptive ACKnowledgment (AACK), for 
solving two significant problems of this technique, which are the limited transmission 
power and receiver collision. We use NS2 to simulate our scheme and compare it with 
the existing schemes such as TWOACK. Video traffic is used as a real application to 
evaluate our scheme. Our results show that AACK outperforms watchdog and TWOACK 
in term of network packet delivery ratio. 
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 ملخص الزسالة
 جنفيذ وجحليل ادآء طزيقة الآدابحف اكنولوجمينث -دهوك المححزكة شبكات الأأكحشاف الحطفل في 
 أنس عبذالواحذ الزبيعي: الاسم
 هنذسة الحاسب الالي: القسم
 شبكات الحاسب الآلي: الحخصص
 9002\6\6: جاريخ المناقشة
 
لاسينٍخ ٍزحشمخ ) ؼشفٍبد(رحزٍخ رزنُ٘ ٍِ أخٖضح ضجنخ الأدٕ٘ك اىَزحشمخ ًٕ ضجنخ لاسينٍخ ثذُٗ ثٍْخ 
ٗ ّزٍدخ ىؼذً ٗخ٘د اداسح ٍشمضٌخ فأُ . رؼزَذ رارٍب ػيى ٍلاءٍخ اػذادارٖب ىيز٘اصو فٍَب ثٍْٖب ٗ رنٌِ٘ ضجنخ الأدٕ٘ك
 ٍؼظٌ اىجشٗر٘م٘لاد اىَقذٍخ ىْقو اىجٍبّبد فً ضجنخ. ٕزٓ الأخٖضح رزنو ػيى ثؼعٖب اىجؼط فً ّقو ثٍبّبد اىطجنخ
ػلاٗح ػيى رىل فإُ . ٗ رفزقش لأي احزٍبؼبد اٍٍْخ ىزأٍٍِ ّقو اىجٍبّبد¸الأدٕ٘ك رفزشض ٗخ٘د ثٍئخ صذٌقخ ٗ ٍزؼبّٗخ
ٗ رىل ثسجت ػَيٖب , ٕزا اىْ٘ع ٍِ اىطجنبد ىذٌٔ ثغشاد ػذٌذح ردؼيٖب ػشظخ لأّ٘اع ٍزؼذدح ٍِ اىٖدَبد اىؼذٗاٍّخ
اىزً , رقٍْبد اىزطفٍش ٗ رحذٌذ اىٌٖ٘خ. افزقبسٕب ىيزحنٌ اىَشمضيٗ , سشػخ رغٍٍش ٍ٘اقغ أخٖضرٖب ٗ ,فً ثٍئخ ٍفز٘حخ
ىزىل رحزبج اىطجنخ ىخػ دفبع ثبًّ ٕٗ٘ اّظَخ . ىٍسذ مبفٍخ ىحَبٌخ اىطجنخ ٍِ اىَزؽفيٍِ, رؼزجش خػ اىذفبع الأٗه
ٕزا اىجحث . ٌِامزطبف اىزؽفو اىزً رؼزجش ٍنَيخ لأّظَخ اىزطفٍش ٗ رحذٌذ اىٌٖ٘خ ىحَبٌخ اىطجنخ ٍِ ٕدَبد اىَزؽفو
ٕزا اىْ٘ع ٍِ اىٖدَبد  ظذمثٍش ٍِ اىحي٘ه اىَقذٍخ . ىٖبٌشمض ػيى اىٖدَبد اىزً رزؼَذ اسقبغ اىجٍبّبد ثذلا ٍِ ر٘صً
ٌذسط ٕزا اىجحث سي٘ك اى٘ٗرص دٗج ٗ ٌقذً رقٍْخ خذٌذح رضٌذ ٍِ ). godhctaW(رؼزَذ ػيى رقٍْخ اى٘ٗرص دٗج 
ٕزٓ . ىزحو ٍطنيزٍِ سئسٍزٍِ ىزقٍْخ اى٘ٗرص دٗج) KCA evitpadA(مفبءح اى٘ٗرص دٗج رؼشف ثإسٌ اداثزف آك 
اسزخذٍْب فً ٕزا اىجحث . ٗ اىزحنٌ ثؽبقخ الاسسبه ىيزغشٌش ػيى اىَشسو, اىَطبمو ًٕ رصبدً اىجٍبّبد ػْذ اىَسزقجو
). KCAOWT(ىَحبمبح حيْب اىَقذً ٗ قبسّبٓ ثبىحو اىَ٘دخ٘د اىز٘ آك ) 2-SN(ثشّبٍح اىَحبمبح اىطٍٖش الإُ إط ر٘ 
.   اىْزبئح دىذ ػيى اُ الاداثزف آك امثش مفبءح ٍِ اى٘ٗرص دٗج ٗ اىز٘ آك ٗ مزىل اقو رنيفخ ٍِ اىز٘ آك
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Before describing the fundamental research topic, a brief introduction into Mobile 
Ad-hoc NETworks (MANETs) is introduced to make the reader more familiar with the 
concept of ad-hoc networks.  
1.1 Ad-hoc Networks Overview  
Ad-hoc is a Latin expression which means "for this purpose". Unlike conventional 
cellular wireless networks that need an expensive infrastructure to support mobility, 
MANETs do not need the expensive or wired infrastructure. In some situations, the 
traditional wireless network that needs a fixed network infrastructure, with base stations 
or access points, is not applicable or not suitable to be used (e.g., military missions, 
disaster recovery or temporary networks like conferences). In such situations we need a 
fast deployment and self-organized network that will be used just for a specific purpose 
for specific period of time. Ad-hoc networks are decentralized, self-configuring, self-
organizing networks and are capable of forming a communication network without 
relying on any fixed infrastructure. They are composed of nodes that relay on each other 
to manage and forward their traffic. Therefore, all the nodes are working as a usual node 
and as a router, where they route the packets of the other nodes. Wireless ad-hoc 
networks can by classified into two types: single hope and multi-hop networks. When 
there are no intermediate nodes between the source and the destination we call the 
network a single hope network. For example, a laptop communicates with other devices 
like a PDA or a video camera using Bluetooth. On the other hand, if the source relay on 
the other nodes to transmit its packets to the destination the network is called a multi-hop 
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ad-hoc network which makes the nodes that are out of radio range of each other to be 
communicating using the help of the other intermediate nodes. A High level description 
about the ad-hoc networks and their related researches is in [Perkins 2000] [Ilyas 2002] 
[Hekmat 2006] [Barbeau 2007][Sarkar 2008]. 
There are many applications for MANETs. Originally, they were developed for 
military purposes, for example, as nodes are scattered on a battlefield for surveillance 
mission [Xiao 2006] and connectivity beyond the line of sight. In recent years, the use of 
MANETs is rapidly increased and ranging from military to civilian and commercial uses. 
For example, we can think of a group of people in conference, they use ad-hoc networks 
to communicate with each other to exchange files and data by using their laptops or 
PDAs. Another promising example for ad-hoc applications is the ubiquitous computing 
like the communication between the smart household appliances. Also, MANETs are the 
suitable solutions in the emergency situations, for example when earthquakes and natural 
disasters have destroyed the existing infrastructure networks. One of the most important 
ad-hoc applications is the sensor networks. Sensor networks have been addressed by 
many researchers in recent years because they have a lot of potential applications. 
Akyildiz et al. [Akyildiz 2002] gave a clear description about sensor networks and their 
nature and applications. 
The main characteristics of MANET are identified as follows [Li 2004]: 
• Autonomous: Each node in MANET is autonomous and works as router and 
host. 
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• Distributed: MANET is distributed in its operation and functionalities, such as 
routing, host configuration and security. For instance, unlike wired network, 
MANET cannot have a centralized firewall. 
• Multi-hop: If the source and destination of a message is out of the radio range of 
one node, a multihop routing is necessary. 
• Dynamic topology: Nodes are mobile and can join or leave the network at any 
time; therefore, the topology is dynamic. 
• Thin terminal: The mobile nodes are often light weight, with less powerful CPU, 
memory and power. 
1.2 Attacks against Ad Hoc Networks 
As MANETs become widely used, the security issue has become one of the primary 
concerns. For example, most of the routing protocols proposed for MANETs assume that 
every node in the network is cooperative and not malicious [Zhang 2003]. Therefore, 
only one compromised node can cause the failure of the entire network. 
There are both passive and active attacks in MANETs. For passive attacks, packets 
containing secret information might be eavesdropped, which violates confidentiality. 
Active attacks, including injecting packets to invalid destinations into the network, 
deleting packets, modifying the contents of packets, and impersonating other nodes 
violate availability, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation. Examples of ad hoc 
networks attacks can be found in [Chun2003],[Chun2-2003],[huang2004] and [Awerbuch 
2004].  
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Proactive approaches such as cryptography and authentication, which considered as 
protection techniques, were first brought into consideration, and many techniques have 
been proposed and implemented. However, these mechanisms are not sufficient. If we 
have the ability to detect the attacker once he comes into the network, we can stop him 
before doing any significant damage to the network or any data. Here is where the 
intrusion detection system comes in [Xiao 2006]. IDSs (Intrusion Detection Systems) 
should complement existing prevention techniques, which considered as the first layer of 
defense, in order to improve the network performance and provide a highly survivable 
system [Sun 2004]. Many researches [Zhou 1999] [Papadimitratos 2002] [Hu 2002] [Hu2 
2002] have been devoted to MANET prevention mechanisms, e.g. cryptography and 
authentication techniques, especially focused on the routing layer.  
In this study, we focus on the dropping packets attacks. There are many reasons for 
dropping packets in ad hoc networks. We can classify these reasons into two main types: 
intended and unintended misbehavior. The unintended misbehavior could be caused by 
many causes such as node overloaded (due to lack of CPU cycles or limited buffer 
space), network congestion or collision. Because wireless channels are known to be 
unreliable [Tanapat 2008], packet dropping may be occurred due to link errors such as 
interference or fading.  
On the other hand, for intended misbehavior, we call the node that causes this type 
of misbehavior as misbehaving node. Furthermore, we classify this type of intended 
misbehavior into two types: the first type is the selfish misbehavior where the node 
participates to carry the routing control packets (the packets of discovery and 
maintenance phases) to extract useful information from it. However, these types of nodes 
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do not participate to route the data packets in order to save its limited energy and network 
bandwidth. The second type of the intended misbehavior is the malicious behavior where 
we call the node that doing this type of misbehaving as a malicious node. As the selfish 
node, this node also participates in routing the routing packets but does not participate in 
routing the data packets. The main purpose of this attack is to disrupt the network and 
affect its connectivity or availability. Figure (1) describes this classification of dropping 
packets misbehavior.  
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Figure ‎1-1: Packet dropping in MANET 
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1.3  MANET Routing Protocols 
There are many proposed routing protocols to MANET. In this section we give a brief 
description about these types and we will focus on the DSR routing protocol, which we will use 
in our simulations. 
1.3.1 MANET Routing Protocols Overview 
Larsson and Hedman [Larsson 1998], and Sun in his PHD research [Sun 2004] have 
given a good overview on the existing routing protocols. Many routing protocols have 
been proposed for MANETs. In general, these protocols could be divided into three 
categories: proactive, reactive, and hybrid. In proactive category, the routing protocol 
find path to every node in the network whether there is a packet ready to be sent or not, 
and update these paths frequently after specific period of time. In contrast, the reactive 
routing protocols do a route discovery to find the destination of the packet, only if there is 
a packet ready to be sent, that is why we call it on demand routing protocols. Whereas, 
the hybrid routing protocols could act as a proactive routing protocol if the destination in 
the same area of the sender, and act as a reactive routing protocol if the destination is 
outside the area of the sender. Figure 1.2 illustrates the classification of these protocols 
and give examples for each type. 
 Proactive routing protocols, such as Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector routing 
protocol (DSDV) [Perkins 1994], the Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP) [Murthy 1996] 
and OSLR [Clausen2003], waste limited bandwidth by continuously maintain the 
complete routing information about the whole network. They react to topology changes, 
even if there is no traffic. They are also called table-driven methods. The protocols in this 
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category differ in the number of tables maintained and the information that each table 
contains as well as the details of how they are updated.  
Reactive routing protocols (such as Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector 
routing protocol (AODV) [Perkins 1999], the Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm 
(TORA) [Park 1997], and the Dynamic Source Routing protocol (DSR) [Johnson 2004]) 
are based on demand for data transmission. They could significantly reduce the routing 
overhead when the traffic is lightweight, since they do not need to periodically update 
route information and do not need to find and maintain the routes when there is no traffic. 
The differences among reactive routing protocols lie in the implementation of the path 
discovery mechanism and optimizations to it.  
Hybrid methods combine proactive and reactive methods to find efficient 
routes. ZHLS [Joa-Ng 1999] is one example of hybrid routing protocols. In ZHLS, the 
whole network is divided into nonoverlapping zones. ZHLS is proactive if the traffic 
destination is within the same zone of the source. It is reactive because a location search 
is needed to find the zone ID of the destination. Also, Zone Routing Protocol, ZRP, a 
hybrid routing protocol suitable for a wide variety of mobile ad-hoc networks, especially 
those with large network spans and diverse mobility patterns [Sygmunt2003]. 
In this thesis, we use DSR as the routing protocol since our work needs a source 
routing protocol, to know the whole nodes in the path before sending a data packet. 
Because of that the DSR routing protocol will be described in more details in the next 
section. 
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Figure ‎1-2: MANET routing protocols classification 
 
1.3.2 DSR Basic Operations 
In this research, the AACK IDS system is built over DSR [Johnson 2004] routing 
protocol because, as we have discussed in last section, our mechanism need a source rout 
protocol and also Watchdog and TWOACK techniques, which we will study in this 
research, used it. Furthermore, Watchdog is restricted to work just under DSR routing 
protocol because it needs to know the entire path that the packet will use to reach its 
destination [Marti2000].  
When a node has a ready packet to send, it searches its cache to find a rout to the 
packet’s destination. If there is no route to the destination in the cache then the sender 
will broadcast a Route REQuest (RREQ) message (illustrated in figure 1.3) to its 
neighbors to ask for route to the packet destination. Each node that receives the RREQ 
from the sender will append its address to the source route in the packet header and 
rebroadcast the RREQ to its neighbors. If any node receives the same RREQ another time 
it will not resend it again and just ignore it. When the RREQ reaches the destination 
node, it will create a Rout REPly (RREP) send it (as unicast packet) back to the initiator 
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of the RREQ (the sender) by reversing the route that it extracts it form the source route of 
the RREQ packet that it receives. Figure l.3.1b, describes this process which represents 
the route discovery phase of DSR.  The second phase is called maintenance phase; in this 
phase the node generates a Route ERRor massage to inform the source if there is a link 
breakage.  
1.4  Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Overview 
Intrusion detection can be defined as a process of monitoring activities in a system, 
which can be a computer or network system. The mechanism by which this is achieved is 
called an intrusion detection system (IDS). An IDS collects activity information and then 
analyzes it to determine whether there are any activities that violate the security rules. 
Once an IDS determines that an unusual activity or an activity that is known to be an 
attack occurs, it then generates an alarm to alert the security administrator. In addition, 
IDS can also initiate a proper response to the malicious activity. Although there are 
several intrusion detection techniques developed for wired networks today, they are not 
suitable for wireless networks due to the differences in their characteristics. Therefore, 
those techniques must be modified or new techniques must be developed to make 
intrusion detection work effectively in MANETs. [Xiao 2006] 
Intrusion prevention measures like encryption and authentication can only prevent 
external nodes from disrupting traffic, but can do little when compromised nodes internal 
to the network begin to disrupt traffic [Mishra 2004]. Many historical events have shown 
that intrusion prevention techniques alone which are usually a first line of defense are not 
sufficient. As the system become more complex, there are also more weaknesses, which 
lead to more security problems.  
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Figure ‎1-3: Route request and route reply in DSR 
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Unlike firewalls which are the first line of defense, intrusion detection can be used as 
a second wall of defense, to protect the network from such problems, and comes after 
intrusion has happened and a node has been compromised. If the intrusion is detected, a 
response can be initiated to prevent or minimize damage to the system. 
Many researchers [Brutch 2003][Mishra 2004][ Xiao 2006] have classified the 
existing IDSs as either host-based or network-based, depending on the data collection 
mechanism. Host-based IDS operate on the operating system’s audit trails, system and 
application logs, or audit data generated by loadable-kernel modules that intercept system 
calls. Network-based IDS operate on packets captured from network traffic. In addition, 
the IDSs may be classified based on the detection technique as described below: 
 Signature-based detection systems: The system keeps signatures of known attacks 
and uses them to compare with the captured data. Any matched pattern is treated as 
an intrusion. This technique may achieve low false positive rates, but does not 
perform well at detecting previously unknown attacks. Like a virus detection system, 
it cannot detect new kinds of viruses. 
 Anomaly-based detection systems: The normal profiles (behaviors) of users are kept 
in the system. The system compares the captured data with these profiles, and then 
deal with any activity that deviates from the baseline as a possible intrusion by 
informing system administrators or initializing a proper response. This system is 
suitable for unknown attacks but it gives high false positives rates. 
 Specification-based detection systems: The system defines a set of constraints that 
describe the correct operation of a program or protocol. Then, it monitors the 
execution of the program with respect to the defined constraints. This technique may 
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provide the capability to detect previously unknown attacks, while exhibiting a low 
false positive rate. 
Another classification based on IDS architecture classifies the existing IDSs to three 
categories: stand alone, distributed and hierarchical. A more detailed taxonomy and 
information about IDSs can be found in [Xiao 2006] [Axelsson 2003] [Debar 2000] 
[Mukherjee 1994]. 
1.5 Research Overview 
In this section we give a background about this research and explain its 
challenges. In addition, we describe the motivation and research main contributions in the 
last subsection of this section.  
1.5.1 Research background 
The early intrusion detection system for MANETs was developed by Marti et al. 
[Marti 2000], which is called Watchdog technique. Where each node will monitor the 
next hop (overhearing using promiscuous mode) to assure that it will forward the packet 
or not. As described in the same research, it has several weaknesses, i.e., ambiguous 
collision, receiver collisions, limited transmission power, false misbehaving, collusion, 
and partial dropping. These weaknesses will be described in the next chapter (literature 
review). There are many researches that are dedicated to solve these problems.  
Actually, our concern was to solve the receiver collision and limited transmission 
power. Where in these vulnerabilities the misbehaving node can cheat the sender 
(monitor) of the packet by make it believe that it correctly forward the packet whereas it 
does not. One solution for those problems was proposed in 2005, which is the TWOACK 
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scheme [Balakrishnan 2005]. It is an acknowledgment based scheme that assures 
transmission of the packet over three consecutive nodes; thereby, the overhearing will not 
used anymore. This mechanism solve the two problems but with significant overhead and 
more calculations that will affect the power and memory of the network, which are scarce 
resource for MANETs. Furthermore, this technique is detecting the misbehaving links 
rather than misbehaving nodes, which is considered as a weakness because in such way 
the misbehaving node will get more chances to drop data packets. 
Our proposed mechanism, AACK will be described in more details in chapter 3, 
concerns were to improve the TWOACK weaknesses, which are, the routing overhead 
and detecting misbehaving links rather than nodes. Therefore, we consider our proposed 
solution for the watchdog two problems that we have mentioned as an enhancement to 
the TWOACK scheme.  
1.5.2 Research Challenges  
It is very challenging to design an intrusion detection system for mobile ad-hoc 
networks. The lack of fixed infrastructures and administration points make it difficult to 
collect audit data for the entire network. Furthermore, we have to consider the scarce 
MANET resources (such as limited wireless bandwidth, computation ability and energy 
supply, etc.) when we design the IDS system for MANETs. Also, mobility makes the 
distinction between false alarms and real intrusions very difficult. For example, a node 
that sends wrong routing information could be because it has been compromised, or 
because of its arbitrary movement. Reducing false alarms while increasing the network 
throughput and minimizing the routing over head are very challenging tradeoffs. Those 
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tradeoffs will be clear when we adjust the important two parameters of the IDS system 
which are timeout and dropping threshold.  
1.5.3 Research Contributions  
The following is a list of contributions of this thesis:  
 Studied the effect of packet dropping misbehaving on mobile ad hoc networks 
using simulations. 
 Proposed a new IDS for MANETs, which solve the two problems of watchdog 
technique, receiver collision and limited power transmission, improves the 
performance of existing mechanisms (TWOACK and Watchdog). 
 Compared intrusion detection mechanisms in various wireless scenarios  
 Examining video traffic over intrusion detection systems over MANETs  
1.6 Organization 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 gives an overview and background 
of wireless ad hoc networks, intrusion detection systems, and thesis. Chapter 2 presents 
the literature review and problem statement of this research. Chapter 3 describes a system 
models and implementation for detection mechanisms, namely watchdog, TWOACK, 
and AACK. Chapter 4 presents simulation environment, studies the detection 
mechanisms in various scenarios, and discusses the results. Lastly, conclusions, 
limitations, and future work are described in chapter 5.   
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2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter we describe our problem statement in the context of literature 
review of watchdog mechanism. It consists of three main sections: the first one is the 
problem statement section, where we describe the watchdog technique with more details 
in its problems. The second section explores the related work in field of intrusion 
detection systems in MANET.  Limitations of current intrusion detection systems are 
discussed in section three. 
2.1 Problem Statement 
This research mainly starts to solve two problems of watchdog intrusion detection 
system. In this section we describe watchdog IDS in more details. At the end of this 
section, we identify our research problems. 
2.1.1 Watchdog Mechanism  
 This research basically considered as an improvement to the watchdog 
mechanism. Therefore, we will describe it in more details in this section, especially its 
weaknesses.  
Watchdog is the base intrusion detection technique that many of the recent 
researches depended on. It was proposed by Sergio Marti et al. [Marti 2000], they 
proposed two techniques that improve throughput in MANETs in the presence of 
misbehaving nodes that agree to forward data packets but rather they drop all data 
packets. Marti et al. classify the reasons that make node to misbehave.  Node may 
misbehave because it is overloaded, selfish, malicious, or broken. An overloaded node 
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lacks the CPU cycles, buffer space, or available network bandwidth to forward packets. A 
selfish node is unwilling to spend battery life, CPU cycles, or available network 
bandwidth to forward packets not of direct interest to it, even though it expects others to 
forward packets on its behalf. A malicious node launches a DoS (Denial of Service) 
attack by dropping packets. A broken node might have a software fault that prevents it 
from forwarding packets.  
They used two techniques to mitigate the decrease in the throughput due to the 
above node categories, the first one is the intrusion detection which is the Watchdog that 
identify misbehaving nodes and the other is the response of the intrusion detection system 
which is  a pathrater that helps routing protocols avoid these nodes. When a node 
forwards a packet, the node’s Watchdog verifies that the next node in the path also 
forwards the packet. The Watchdog does this by listening promiscuously to the next 
node’s transmissions. If the next node does not forward the packet, it is misbehaving. 
Every time a node fails to forward the packet, the Watchdog increments the failures 
counter. If the counter exceeds a certain threshold, it determines that the node is 
misbehaving; this node is then avoided using the pathrater. The pathrater, run by each 
node in the network, combines knowledge of misbehaving nodes with link reliability data 
to pick the route most likely to be reliable, it uses the reliability metric instead of shortest 
path. Each node maintains a rating for every other node it knows about in the network. It 
calculates a path metric by averaging the node ratings in the path. The Watchdog 
technique has its own advantages and weaknesses. Watchdog’s weaknesses are that it 
might not detect a misbehaving node in the presence of: 
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 Ambiguous collisions: These prevent node A from overhearing the transmission 
from node B, as shown in Fig. 1. 
 Receiver collisions: Node A can only tell whether B has sent a packet, but not if 
node C received it or not, as shown in Fig. 2. 
 Limited transmission power: A misbehaving node could limit its transmission 
power such that the signal is strong enough to be overheard by the previous node 
but too weak to be received by the true recipient. As shown in Fig. 3. 
 False misbehavior: This occurs when a node falsely reports other nodes as 
misbehaving. 
 Partial dropping: A node can circumvent the Watchdog by dropping packets at a 
lower rate than the Watchdog’s configured minimum misbehaving threshold.  
 
Figure ‎2-1: Node A does not hear node B forward packet 1 to C, because B's 
transmission collides at A with packet 2 from source S. 
 
 
 
Figure ‎2-2: Node A believes that node B has forwarded packet 1 to C, although C never 
received the packet due to a collision with packet2. 
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Figure ‎2-3: Node B limits its transmission power such that the signal is strong enough to 
be overheard by node A but too weak to be received by node C. 
 
2.1.2  Research Problem Statement    
Because there are many intrusion detection systems are built based on watchdog 
technique, we focus or research to solve some of the watchdog problems. As we will 
describe in the related work, next section, some of the Watchdog problems, which have 
been mentioned above, are discussed and solutions are proposed for those problems.  In 
this thesis we proposed a solution to tackle two problems of watchdog, which are the 
receiver collisions in figure 2 and the limited transmission power in figure 3.  
2.2 Related Work 
The IDSs is considered as a second layer of defense, it should be a complement 
for existing prevention techniques [Sun 2004]. There are many researches that have been 
devoted to improve protection of MANETs against misbehaving nodes 
[Zhou1999][Hu2002][Hu2-2002][Zapata2002][Patwardhan2005]. Actually, our research 
is focused on intrusion detection techniques. There are several classifications for the 
proposed intrusion detection systems. As discussed in chapter 1, Ping [Yi 2005] classified 
the existing IDSs based on the detection algorithm to anomaly, misuse, specification-
based detection. Also, [Tanapat 2008] classified them into reputation-based and 
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incentive-based IDS, and this is what we follow in our literature review as shown in 
figure 2.4. 
Misbehaving Nodes 
Mitigation
 
Reputation-based Incentive-based
 
Figure ‎2-4: MANETs IDS Classification 
Before we start to explore the IDS mechanisms, a general architecture for IDS in 
MANET is presented by Yougguang et al. [Zhang 2000]. It gives a general view how 
IDS is implemented, in most cases, over MANETs. They proposed general intrusion 
detection and intrusion response architecture for MANETs. An individual IDS agent is 
attached to each mobile node, and each node in the network is responsible for both 
intrusion detection and intrusion response. Collaborative decision making: Each node 
participates actively in the intrusion detection process. Once one node detects an 
intrusion with confidence high enough, this node can start a response to the intrusion. In a 
simple implementation of this design as shown in figure 2.5, a majority voting scheme is 
used to determine whether attack happens. 
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Figure ‎2-5: General intrusion detection and response system 
2.2.1 Reputation-based mechanisms 
A reputation-based mechanism uses a reputation system in order to detect and rate 
misbehaving nodes. A clear definition for reputation system is presented by 
[Buchegger2005] as the performance of a node participating in the base protocol as seen 
by others. Although the watchdog is considered as a reputation-based mechanism, we 
described it in the previous section because it is highly related to our problem statement.  
CORE, a COllaborative REputation mechanism proposed by Michiardi et al. 
[Michiardi 2002], also use a watchdog mechanism; however it is complemented by a 
sophisticated reputation mechanism that differentiates between subjective reputation 
,which is gained by observations, indirect reputation that uses positive reports by others, 
and functional reputation. These three components are weighted for a combined 
reputation value that is used to make decisions about cooperation or gradual isolation of a 
node. Each node participates in the IDS and has reputation table and watchdog 
mechanism. The reputation table keeps track of reputation values of other nodes in the 
network. Since a misbehaving node can send accuse a good node, just a positive rating 
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factors can be distributed in CORE. A performance analysis by simulation is stated for 
future work. This mechanism still uses the watchdog mechanism with its disadvantages 
and problems.  
Sonja Buchegger and Jean Boudec proposed another reputation mechanism that is 
called “CONFIDANT", which stands for Cooperation Of Nodes: Fairness In Dynamic 
Ad-hoc NeTworks [Buchegger 2002]. CONFIDANT has four main components, namely 
a monitor, a reputation system, a path manager, and a trust manager. These components 
are required to be implemented in every node. Each node monitors its neighbors by 
listening to the transmission of the next node or by watching routing protocol behavior. A 
trust manager is used to manage ALARM messages, which are sent when a misbehaving 
node is detected. The reputation system is used to rate every node in a network. A path 
manager is responsible to rank a path according to a security metric, e.g., reputation of 
the node in the path and to get rid of any path containing a selfish node. In addition, a 
path manager will penalize a selfish node by denying all services to it. Through a study 
the protocol performance, the authors showed that the throughput given by CONFIDANT 
in a scenario when a third of nodes behave selfishly is very close to the throughput of a 
normal network condition without selfish nodes. However, it is also still depends on the 
watchdog mechanism which still has many problems.  
“CineMA", stands for Cooperation Enhancement in MANETs, is proposed to 
respond to a misbehaving node by limiting the number of packets forwarded by it [Frank 
2004]. Likewise CORE and CONFIDANT, CineMA depends in watchdog technique and 
uses the same penalty scheme as in CORE and CONFIDANT by excluding the 
misbehaving node from the routing phase. Unlike CORE and CONFIDANT, not all the 
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nodes work IDS; CineMA only needs a group of nodes to perform necessary functions. It 
consists of three main modules including a Watchdog module, a reputation system 
module, and an interface queue module. A Watchdog module performs system 
monitoring to collect information. A reputation system uses collected information to 
determine the level of cooperation based on the number of received packets and the 
number of forwarded packets. These values are also used, at the interface queue module, 
to limit the amount of packets which a selfish node is allowed to transmit. CineMA 
requires the use of a cryptographic mechanism to ensure secure communications among 
all nodes implementing CineMA functions. Although, overall throughput and 
performance of CineMA have not been proven, a major advantage of CineMA is that it 
can limit the sending rate of a misbehaving node. That can mitigate the effect of false 
alarms by avoiding excluding the node completely. 
Animesh and Amitabh [Patcha 2003] proposed another research that made an 
extension to the Watchdog technique as an improvement by tackling the problem of 
collusion attack, where more than one node collaborate to do a malicious behavior. 
Furthermore, they assumed that the few nodes that formed the network are trusted nodes 
and the others that would join the network later are ordinary nodes. The Watchdog nodes 
are selected from the trusted nodes, and thus they avoid the problem of false reporting. In 
every Watchdog, two thresholds are maintained for all its neighbors that are not trusted 
nodes. The first one is called the SUSPECT_THRESHOLD, a measure of node's 
misbehaving, and the other is called ACCEPTANCE_THRESHOLD, a measure of 
node's good behavior. And based on these thresholds the Watchdog node will identify the 
neighboring nodes as a malicious or trusted node. This mechanism is built over AODV 
23 
 
and aims to detect a black hole attack, dropping all data packets. Likewise the previous 
mechanisms, this mechanism also depends on watchdog technique. In contrast with our 
proposed mechanism, it is proposed to solve a collusion problem of watchdog in which 
two malicious nodes cooperate to do a malicious activity.  
Parker et al [Parker 2004] improves and enhances the Watchdog technique, which 
is viable just for DSR routing protocol. Their proposed solution is applicable to all of the 
routing protocols used in MANETs, not just DSR. In contrast to the Watchdog, the nodes 
overhearing all the other nodes in their proximity not just the next forward node on the 
path. They proposed two response mechanisms. The passive response mode where each 
node acts independently and eventually the intrusive node will be blocked from using all 
network resources. The other mechanism is the active response mode where the decision 
making is done by a cluster head by initiates a voting procedure. If the majority 
determines that the suspected node is in fact intrusive, an alert will be broadcast 
throughout the network and the intrusive node will be blocked from using network 
resources. 
One solution that solves the problems of the receiver collision and limited 
transmission power is proposed by Balakrishnan et al [Balakrishnan 2005]; it is an 
acknowledgment-base protocol, which is called TWOACK.  It does not rely on 
overhearing other nodes in its vicinity; thereby, in contrast to all the previous 
mechanisms, it does not use a watchdog technique. This scheme can be added on to a 
source routing protocol such as DSR. It acknowledges every data packet transmitted over 
every three consecutive nodes along the path form source to destination. Suppose node A 
has discovered a route to F with a source route A → B → C → D → E → F. In 
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TWOACK when B forwards a packet for A, C (the node two hops away from A) receives 
the packet and sends an acknowledgement to A indicating B has forwarded the packet 
properly. If A does not get an acknowledgement for the packet, it expected to be 
forwarded by B to C, within a certain timeout period it suspects B to be misbehaving. The 
same procedure is carried out by every set of three consecutive nodes along the source 
route. In TWOACK each forwarded packet has to be acknowledged which may 
contribute to traffic congestion on the routing path. They also proposed S-TWOACK 
(Selective TWOACK) to reduce this extra traffic by sending a single acknowledgement 
for a number of packets instead of for a single packet.  
As they mentioned in their paper that S-TWOACK reduces the overhead but with 
cost of less packet delivery ratio. That is because the malicious node will take more time 
to drop more packets. Even with the S-TWOACK, this scheme still adds more overhead 
to the routing protocol because of the many acknowledgments for each packet along the 
path especially in cases of overload and long paths. Furthermore, it has less detection 
accuracy because it detects links rather than nodes. Thus, the malicious node will has 
several chances even if it will be detected in one link it can works on other link. Because 
our proposed mechanism is considered as improvement for TWOACK, this mechanism 
will be discussed in more details in chapter 3.  
Islam et al. [Islam 2005] have proposed another way to solve the problems of 
receiver collision and limited transmission. For a flow f each node, h hops away from the 
source in the routing path, measures the rate R[f, h] at which it processes packets. At the 
source, intermediate and destination nodes processing of packets refers to sending, 
forwarding and receiving packets respectively. The value of h for source is 0 and it 
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increases for subsequent nodes towards the destination. At the end of each period T, the 
destination puts R[f, h=destination] in a packet called the route status packet (RSP) and 
sends it to the source through all the intermediate nodes of f. Each intermediate node also 
appends R[f, h] to RSP before sending to the next node. R[f, h] can be digitally signed by 
its respective node to prevent other nodes from modifying it. When RSP reaches the 
source node, it contains R[f, h] values of all the downstream2 nodes of f. Now we can 
estimate the forwarding ratio of a node h hops away from the source by the following 
expression: 
Forwarding ratio, F[f, h] = R[f, h + 1] /  R[f, h − 1] 
If Delivery ratio, R[f, h = destination] / R[f, 0] < Rthres[f]  
Where Rthres[f] is the allowable minimum end-to-end delivery ratio for the flow 
f, the source suspects the intermediate node, h hops away from the source with the 
highest F[f,h], is dropping packets at an intolerable rate. The source maintains a 
misbehavior counter MC[f,h] for each downstream node. If MC[f,h] reaches a threshold 
for a downstream node, the source declares the node to be misbehaving. This approach 
minimizes the overhead on the network traffic that was in the approach of Balakrishnan 
et al. but here the IDS system depends on information that comes from the misbehaving 
nodes. The adversary node can change its R[f,h] value which could lead to increase false 
alarms. 
In [Hasswa 2005], Hasswa et al proposed a novel intrusion detection and response 
system called Routeguard. In this technique the two techniques that were proposed by 
Marti et al., Watchdog and pathrater, are combined to classify each neighbor node as: 
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fresh, member, unstable, suspect, or malicious. The class of each node depends on the 
ratings obtained from the Watchdog according to its behavior. Furthermore, each class 
has a different trust level which goes from member (trusted), which allows the node to 
participate in the network, to Malicious (untrusted), which is completely untrusted and 
gets banned from the network. Routeguard is run by each node in the network and stores 
a rating for all the nodes it knows, and this is similar to the process of pathrater. 
Routeguard improves Pathrater by assigns ratings to nodes and calculates a path metric in 
a refined way. Furthermore, Routeguard introduces a more detailed and natural 
classification system that rates each node in the network. However, it is still using a 
watchdog technique with its all problems.  
Nasser and Chen [Nasser 2007] proposed IDS that is considered as an extension 
for watchdog by solving a problem of collusion attack. In this work, they proposed an 
enhanced intrusion detection system for discovering malicious nodes in MANETs called 
ExWatchdog. ExWatchdog extends the Watchdog proposed by Marti et al. In this paper 
they solve one of the problems that we have introduced above in the weaknesses of the 
Watchdog technique which is the false misbehaving problem, a malicious node falsely 
reports other nodes as misbehaving while in fact it is the real intruder. A table is 
maintained by each node, this table records the number of packets the node sends, 
forwards or receives respectively. When the source receives a report about misbehaving 
node, he will find another path to ask the destination node about the number of received 
packets. If  the number of received packets equal to the number of packets that the source 
has sent, then the real malicious node is the node that reports others nodes as 
misbehaving. Otherwise, nodes being reported malicious do misbehave. However, there 
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is a limitation in this technique. If the true misbehaving node is in the all available paths 
from source to destination, as shown in figure 2.6, then it is impossible to confirm and 
check the number of packets with the destination. Furthermore, it conditions that there 
are another path to the destination.  
 
Figure ‎2-6: A is a malicious node that falsely reports all nodes on the available paths 
from source to destination as misbehaving in order to affect the availability of the 
network. 
Like all the previous proposed mechanisms, Cop mechanism [Tanapat 2008] is 
proposed to improve the network performance in which misbehaving nodes are 
presented. Tanapat in his dissertation proposed a Cop mechanism to minimize the power 
consumption in watchdog mechanism by assigning the monitoring and detection 
functions to some of the nodes rather than all nodes. Cop nodes are selected as trusted 
nodes, and they are deployed by static placement to cover the whole area or the moves 
around the whole area of the network and do the monitoring for misbehaving nodes. Cops 
improves watchdog in terms of power consumption but still use watchdog and by that it 
suffering the same problems of watchdog that we propose a solution for some of it. 
Furthermore, in case of mobile cops there would be some of the regions that stays 
without monitoring whereas in case of all nodes applying detection functions this will not 
be happened.  
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Table ‎2-1: Reputation-based IDSs summary 
Mechanism 
Published 
Date 
RP 
Detection 
Function 
Misbehaving 
Detected 
Use 
WD 
Problems 
Solved 
Watchdog 2000 DSR All nodes All Packet Drop (APD) Yes None 
CORE 2002 All All Selective Packet Drop (SPD) Yes 
Partial 
dropping 
CONFIDANT 2002 DSR All APD + Routing Attacks Yes None 
Patcha 2003 AODV Some APD Yes Collusion 
CineMA 2004 DSR Some SPD Yes 
Partial 
dropping 
Parker 2004 All Some APD Yes None 
TWOACK 2005 DSR All  APD No RC+TC 
Routeguard 2005 DSR All SPD Yes 
Partial 
dropping 
ExWatchdog 2007 DSR All APD Yes 
False 
Misbehaving 
Cop 2008 DSR Some APD Yes None 
 
2.2.2 Incentive-based mechanisms 
 The incentive-based mechanisms do not be considered as detection systems 
because they just motivate the network nodes to cooperate with each other in forwarding 
packets. However, we prefer to select some of this type of researches because it is 
considered as misbehaving nodes mitigation.  
In this type of mechanisms the nodes have to pay to forward their packets. To do 
that, these mechanisms use virtual money (or credits) [Buttyan 2003] or apply incentive 
mechanism. Any node that participates in packet forwarding will gain credits and it will 
use these credits to forward its own packets. If the node does not participate in 
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forwarding the packets of other nodes, it will not collect credits to forward its own 
packets. 
In [Buttyan 2003] Buttyan and Hubaux proposed the use of virtual currency, 
called nuglets. When a node forwards a packet for others, a nuglet counter of that node is 
incremented by one. When a source node wants to send a packet, it must have enough 
nuglets, which is more than the number of intermediate nodes required to reach a 
destination. If a source node has enough nuglets, it can send packets. Otherwise, it must 
first collect more nuglets by forwarding packets from other source nodes. A tamper proof 
device must be used to maintain the nuglet counter. Thus, it depends on a hardware part 
to be established on each node, which makes it more difficult to be implemented in real 
scenarios. 
In [Zhang 2004], Zhang proposed a Secure Incentive Protocol (SIP) that uses a 
session-based approach rather than per-packet-based approach. However, SIP assumed 
the use of a tamper-proof module, similar to the work in [Buttyan 2003]. In the SIP 
protocol, a session initiator and a session responder (a source-destination pair) will be 
charged for a service and intermediate nodes are rewarded with credits when they 
forward packets for a source-destination pair. SIP consists of three phases, i.e., Session 
initialization phase, Data forwarding phase and Rewarding phase. Each intermediate node 
is awarded a number of credits based on the number of forwarded packets.  
Most of the incentive-based approaches use a security hardware part to hold the 
counter of the credits. This is improper choose to be applied in limited resource devises 
like ad hoc network devices.  
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2.3 Limitation of current IDSs 
To mitigate packet dropping in mobile ad hoc networks, many solutions have 
been proposed. As we have discussed in the previous section, these mechanisms are 
classified into incentive-based, which is not applicable yet [Tanapat 2008], and the 
reputation-based. Our concentration was on the reputation-base intrusion detections. 
Most of these mechanisms, as we have discussed in the previous section, depends on 
watchdog technique. Some of them have focused on improving the detection efficiency 
without solving the problems that are stated by the watchdog mechanism paper [Marti 
2000]. And the others focus on extending watchdog mechanism to work with other 
MANET routing protocols rather than DSR; or to detect selective packet dropping rather 
that all data packet dropping attacks. Some of them extended watchdog to tackle another 
type of attack, e.g. routing attacks, like in CONFIDANT [Buchegger 2002]. 
The only one that is considered as replacement to watchdog is the TWOACK 
mechanism [Balakrishnan 2005]. It tackles the two problems that we considered in our 
research. However, its detection system is not effective because it detects the 
misbehaving on link level rather than node level. That means it detects misbehaving links 
instead of nodes in which it gives more chance to the malicious node to drop more 
packets in each link it appears. Furthermore, it has more control packets overhead due to 
the TWOACK packets. These overhead packets will increase the network errors, e.g. 
network congestion and network collisions, which degrade the network performance. In 
addition, in TWOACK technique the intermediate nodes will do the detection 
functionality all the time, which will increase the computation time and use more 
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memory space due to the data base of sent packets; thereby, this will increase the power 
consumption, which affects one of the scarce resources of MANET nodes.  
In AACK mechanism, minimizing TWOACK overhead while improving network 
performance is one of our considerations. In addition, we considered minimizing the 
power consumption by making the nodes that does detection functionality not working all 
the time. Instead, it works just if there will be a misbehaving activity along the path form 
source to destination. Finally, we improved the detection accuracy of TWOACK by 
introducing an algorithm to detect malicious nodes rather than links.     
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3 SYSTEM MODELS AND DESIGN 
 
In this chapter, we discuss the mechanisms and models that we have studied in 
our work in more details. Basically, we implemented three mechanisms in our study. The 
first one is the early solution of the packet dropping attacks in MANETs which is the 
watchdog technique.  The second is the TWOACK technique which is proposed to solve 
some of the watchdog problems and we will use it in our proposed solution with some 
enhancements. Finally, we discuss our proposed intrusion detection system, which is 
named AACK, and this phrase stands for Adaptive ACKnowledgment IDS for MANT. 
 
3.1 Overview 
As we have discussed in the literature review, the malicious or selfish node can 
degrade the performance of ad hoc networks significantly by dropping the data packets 
silently. Throughout this chapter, we use the malicious node phrase to represent both 
selfish and malicious node because they have the same misbehavior, where both of them 
intend to drop data packets. Actually as we have described early, there are two types of 
packet dropping attacks. The first one,   which we take in our consideration in this study, 
the malicious node will drop all the data packets while it participates in forwarding the 
routing packets this type is known as black hole attack. Similar to the first type is the 
second type attack, which is known as gray hole attack; the only difference is that the 
second type is smarter because it does not drop all the data packets. Rather, it tries to 
adjust its packet dropping rate to the detection threshold; thereby it makes it very difficult 
for the IDS system to detect such attack. However, the fist type (dropping all data 
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packets) effect on network performance is more than the second type because it is disrupt 
the network and affect its availability and connectivity. Furthermore, the false alarms are 
more in the case of second type. In this study, when we use the expression of packet 
dropping attack, we mean the first type, which is the black hole attack. This type is one of 
the Denial of Service attacks (DoS). 
 
A simple and early solution to avoid packet dropping attacks is to use a watchdog 
technique as proposed in [Marti 2000]. However, this technique has many problems, as 
discussed in the literature review, especially for smart attackers who can cheat the 
monitor node and intend to do a collision at the next hop node by sending  the packet 
while the received node busy with other transmissions. Also, a smart attacker can control 
its transmission power to let the monitor overhears its transmission while the next hop 
node is out of its range. We refer to these two problems as receiver collision and limited 
power transmission respectively, as it is called by watchdog mechanism in [Marti 2000]. 
These two problems have been discussed in more details in the problem statement 
section.   
 
One of the most recently published solutions for these problems was The 
TWOACK mechanism [Balakrishnan2005]. It applies an acknowledgment-based 
approach to the routing layer to verify the delivery of data packet over every three 
consecutive nodes (each two hops) throughout the path from source to destination. 
Actually, this mechanism solved the two problems that we have mentioned before, but 
with more overhead. Furthermore, in contrast to watchdog, TWOACK detects a 
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misbehaving links instead of detecting misbehaving nodes. In this case, the TWOACK 
will not completely detect misbehavior node and it is still operate in the network and can 
drop more packets. That makes TWOACK less accurate in detecting misbehaving nodes.  
 
In this research, we proposed the AACK, Adaptive Acknowledgment, mechanism 
which is an enhancement of TWOACK. Unlike TWOACK, our mechanism does a 
complete detection for the misbehaving node rather than a partial detection in TWOACK 
where it detects a misbehaving links. Furthermore, it decreases the overhead of the 
TWOACK acknowledgments for paths which has more than 2 hops. After we add the 
enhancement of node detection to the TWOACK we call it E-TWOACK and use it to 
implement our mechanism (AACK).  AACK is called adaptive because it is a hybrid 
mechanism where it is composed of end-to-end acknowledgment and TWOACK schemes 
(two hops acknowledgment). 
3.2  Model Assumptions 
 In this section we outline our assumptions as follows: 
 Our mechanism works on a source routing protocol, e.g. in our implementation 
we use the routing protocol of Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [Johnson 2004].  
 Throughout this study, we assume a bi-directional communication between every 
pair of nodes in the network. That means, if node N2 can receive a packet from 
node N1, node N1 also can receive a packet from N2. Such a symmetry 
communication is required in our model for sending AACK and E-TWOACK 
packets in the opposite direction.  
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 We also assume that there is no collusion between misbehaving nodes, and the 
misbehaving nodes are capable of doing the following tasks: 
o Dropping any data packet. 
o Participating in the routing discovery and maintenance. 
o Controlling its transmission power to circumvent the watchdog monitor. 
o Capable of doing a collision at the receiving node by overhearing when 
receiving node is transmitting. 
3.3 Node and Switching Models 
 In our implementations of the three schemes (watchdog, TWOACK, and AACK) 
we used two types of mobile wireless nodes: regular and malicious. We did some 
modifications to these nodes to appropriate or work. The main functions, modifications, 
and behavior of these nodes will be described in this section. A switching scheme, 
between AACK and E-TWOACK, is described also in this section.   
3.3.1 Regular Node Model 
To implement the AACK mechanism, the regular node must be modified to work 
properly with AACK. According to network simulator NS2 that we used in our 
simulations [NS2], the regular nodes of mobile ad hoc networks can be classified into 
three types of nodes based on the events that can be occurred by nodes:  
 Source Node, which is the source where the packets are generated. 
 Forwarder Node, which is the intermediate node in the path from source to 
destination that receive and forward the packet to the next hop until it reaches to 
the final destination. 
 Destination Node, which is the final destination of the packet. 
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Figure ‎3-1: Nodes Classification 
Figure 3.1 illustrates an example of the three types of nodes in the path. Where node S is 
the source node, D is the destination, and (N1, N2, N3) are the forwarder nodes. The 
functionality of the three types of nodes is modified to accommodate the AACK 
mechanism. Our modifications to these nodes are described as follows: 
 Source Node 
We modified the source node to work in two modes and based on the node mode, 
the first mode is the AACK and the other is the E-TWOACK mode. To make source 
node capable of switching between the two modes, a switching scheme is developed. The 
switching algorithm will be described in the next section. For that purpose, we classified 
the data packets to two types: AACK (AA) packet, and TWOACK (TA) packet. When 
source node is in the mode of AACK it will send AA packets, while if it is in the E-
TWOACK mode it will send TA packets. 
 
 Forwarder Node 
The forwarder node, intermediate node, works based on the packet type. If it is a 
TWOACK packet (TA), the node will work according to the E-TWOACK scheme. For 
example, in the figure 3.1 after N3 received the TA packet it will send a TWOACK 
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acknowledgment to N1 and that is done for each three consecutive nodes throughout the 
whole path. In a different way, if the packet type is an AACK packet (AA), the node will 
just work as a regular node with basic DSR functions where it will forward the packet to 
the next hop.  
 
The energy and memory consumption are important factors for MANETs. That is 
one of our scheme advantages over TWOACK. In TWOACK, the intermediate nodes do 
the calculations at the node all the time, whereas AACK works most of the time as a 
regular node with basic DSR functions. In such situation of mobile nodes that suffering 
from lack of power and memory spaces, our scheme will save more energy (no 
TWOACK calculations in CPU all the time of forwarding packets). In addition, because 
it will not save the AA packet id and its sending time, as it does in TA packets, it will 
save more memory space. Furthermore, the node will not send acknowledgment packets 
all the time of the session (sending all packets from one source to specific destination). 
Figure 3.2 shows the procedure of forwarder node when it receives a TA and AA 
data packets, it is clear from the diagram that the forwarder node will normally forward 
that packet (without send TWOACK acknowledgment and register the id and forwarding 
time of the packet) in two cases, the first case when the packet type is AA (AACK). The 
other case, when the forwarder node is away from the source by just one hop.  
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Figure ‎3-2: Forwarder Node Activity When receiving TA & AA data packets 
 Destination node 
The destination node will also respond to the received data packet based on the 
type of the packet. If the received packet type is TA packet, the node will behave as the 
forwarder node when it receives TA data packet. Except that it will not register the packet 
id and the forwarding time because it is the final destination of the packet. In addition, it 
will also send a small packet switch to the source node to tell it to change its mode, this 
will be describe in more details in the next section of switching model. On the other hand, 
if the received packet type is an AA packet it will just send an AACK acknowledgment 
(end-to-end acknowledgment) to the source node, the originator of the packet. Figure 3.3 
give a clear diagram of destination node response for received data packet.  
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Figure ‎3-3: Destination node activity when receiving TA & AA data packets 
3.3.2 Switching Model 
This section will describe in details the switching model that we developed to 
work with our AACK scheme. As we have described in the last section, the system works 
in two modes (AACK and E-TWOACK) according to the state of the network (whether 
there are malicious nodes or not). That is why we call it an adaptive mechanism. 
Therefore, it needs a mechanism that can switch between the two modes of the IDS 
system. For that purpose, the data packets are classified to two types. Each type work 
with one mode, i.e. AA packets associated with AACK mode and TA packets associated 
with E-TWOACK mode. To do that, we used one pit from the reserved field in the DSR 
fixed portion header; figure 3.4 illustrates the DSR header format as shown in the internet 
draft of DSR [Johnson 2004].  
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Figure ‎3-4: DSR header format with the packet type bit T 
As illustrated in the figure 3.4, pit number 9 (T) from the reserved field is used to 
classify the data packets. In our implementation, we assigned a value of 1 to T to identify 
the TA packets (E-TWOACK mode), and assigned a value of 0 to identify the AA 
packets (AACK mode), thereby, for example, the forwarder node can check this bit to see 
if the packet is AA or TA and responds accordingly, as discussed in the previous section.  
The source node is the only node that can change this bit depending on the mode of the 
source, and it applies this to all the data packets that it sends.  
The source and destination node are responsible for switching mechanism in the 
AACK IDS, which means that the forwarder node will not do any type of control to the 
switching mechanism. The role of the destination is to initiate and send a switch packet to 
the source node when it receives a TA packet, as described in the previous section. The 
switch packet is a small DSR packet which carries a unique value that will be recognized 
by the source node. At the other side, the source node will start any session or flow by 
setting this bit to 0, which means that it will start in the AACK mode. Two cases that 
enforce the source to change its mode: 
1. Timeout of AA packet without receiving AACK acknowledgment from 
destination will change the mode from AACK to E-TWOACK. 
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2. Receiving a switch packet from destination will change the mode form E-
TWOACK to AACK. 
To simplify the understanding of the dynamic switching during the 
communication between the source and the destination, we will describe two situations. 
The first, when there is a malicious node in the path. The second, when the packet 
dropping occurs because of an error (non-intended), such as buffer overflow or collision, 
rather than maliciously dropped (intended). In first situation, where the malicious node 
exists on the path, using the scenario in figure 3.1, suppose the malicious node is N2. 
When source begins the session of sending packets to the destination in AACK mode, it 
will send the AA data packet after registering the packet id and sending time. The 
malicious node N2 will drop the packet, and the source will wait for a period of time (AA 
timeout) if no AACK acknowledgment received it will switch the mode of sending 
packets to E-TWOACK in which it will detect the malicious node. 
In the second situation, where the packet will be dropped due to an error, also the 
source will act as in the first situation and change the mode to E-TWOACK, but here the 
first packet of TA data packets will be received by the destination because there is no 
malicious node in the path. When the destination node received a TA packet type, it will 
know that there was an error cause packet dropping and change the source mode; thereby 
it will send a switch packet to tell the source to go back to the AACK mode. Figure 3.5 
will clarify the switching process at source node. 
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Figure ‎3-5: Dynamic Switching Procedure at Source Node 
3.3.3 Malicious Node Model 
In this study, we use the terminology malicious node to represent both selfish and 
malicious nodes because all of them work as a regular node and cooperate with other 
nodes in the network in route discovery phase, where it exchanges the routing 
information with its neighbors to find a route to a destination. Selfish node does that to 
learn more about the network to benefit itself. In addition, the main function of malicious 
node (selfish and malicious) is to drop all the data packets that pass through it. It will also 
drop all alarm packets than could pass through it in order to protect itself. Furthermore, 
we take in our consideration the presence of smart attackers which can exploit the 
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receiver collision and limited transmission power vulnerabilities in watchdog system; 
thereby we mix the malicious nodes in our simulation with fixed percentage of 40% with 
smart attackers and the rest with regular attackers.  
 
Figure ‎3-6: Malicious Node Procedure 
3.4 Watchdog Model  
In this research, a watchdog mechanism is studied for comparison with the 
TWOACK and AACK mechanisms.  
It works as the passive acknowledgment in DSR [Johnson 2004], where each 
source or forwarder node, after sending a data packet, will stay listening to the next hop 
to verify if it will forward the received packet or not. If the next hop node does not 
forward the packet within the specific time (timeout), the node which is watching the next 
hop node will mark this node as suspicious by increasing its warning counter. If this 
counter reaches a specific threshold, the node marked as a malicious node and an alarm is 
sent to the source node. After receiving the alarm, the source node will purge its route 
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cache from all paths that contain the malicious node. Moreover, it will change the path to 
the destination and send the rest of packets over the new path. . Figure 3.7 demonstrates 
the pseudo code of watchdog implementation [Tanapat 2008].  
Two important parameters are adjusted experimentally in our implementation. 
The first one is the timeout parameter and the second is the maximum threshold. There is 
a tradeoff when we adjust them. When we adjust a large value it will give the malicious 
node more chance to drop packets, whereas if we adjust them with small value it will 
increase the accusations of the innocent nodes (false alarms). 
 
Figure ‎3-7: Watchdog Pseudo Code 
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3.5 TWOACK Model 
We have implemented the TWOACK model to compare it with our proposed 
mechanism. In addition, we use it with some improvements, discussed in section 4.1, in 
our mechanism; thereby, we will describe it in more details in this section.  For more 
information about TWOACK mechanism, refer to [Balakrishnan2005]. Figure 3.8, 
describes its procedure step by step. Each three consecutive nodes, e.g. N1—N2—N3, 
will apply the TWOACK acknowledgment based procedure. In the figure 3.8, in the first 
step the source generate a data packet and send it to the first forwarder, this node will not 
send any acknowledgment because it is not two hops away from the source, as show in 
second step the first forwarder just forward the packet to the next hop. In third step, the 
second forwarder receives the data packet and does the following steps: 
1. Generates an acknowledgment packet, which is called a TWOACK packet, 
carrying the received data packet id. 
2. Sends this TWOACK packet in the opposite direction of the data flow to the node 
located two hops back, in this case the source node, by extracting the route from 
the source route of the data packet. 
3. Checks if the next hop is the destination node it will just forward the packet, if it 
is not it will register the packet id and its sending time. 
This procedure, which is done by the third forwarder, will be done by the rest of 
forwarders along the path. Figure 3.9 shows the data structure that is used by the sender 
or forwarder to register the sent packets.  
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Figure ‎3-8: Data structure of the registered information of sent data packet 
In each three consecutive nodes along the path, e.g. [S … N1 N2 N3 … D], N1 
will register the link N2-N3 in its data base as shown in figure 3.9. It will register the next 
hop, N2, and the second hop, N3, and associate with it the misbehaving counter, CMIS, and 
list by all data packet IDs that are sent by N1 through the link N2-N3 and waiting for 
TWOACK packet. In addition, it will stamp every data packet id by the sending time, to 
calculate the timeout. 
Detection algorithm is described briefly in figure 3.10. As mentioned above each 
link is associated with a misbehaving counter CMIS.  As in the example above, N1 
increases the misbehaving counter CMIS  every time the packet id remains in the list for a 
period of time more than pre-specified timeout without receiving a TWOACK packet 
from N3 that acknowledge the data packet receiving at node N3. This counter is 
increased until it reaches a specific limit, which is called a misbehaving threshold. If CMIS 
counter exceeds the misbehaving threshold, the whole link will be considered as a 
misbehaving link and an alarm is sent to the source node.   
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Figure ‎3-9: TWOACK Mechanism Description, Tracing one packet travels along the 
route from source to destination 
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Figure ‎3-10: TWOACK Detection Procedure 
3.6 AACK Model 
In this section, we will describe our proposed mechanism in more details. As 
we have discussed in the beginning of this chapter, AACK is an abbreviation of 
Adaptive Acknowledgment, which composed of two main schemes. First scheme, 
will be described in section 3.6.1, is the Enhanced TWOACK (E-TWOACK); and the 
other is the AACK, will be described in section 3.6.2, which is the end to end 
acknowledgment scheme. Note that it has the same name as the composed 
mechanism AACK.  
3.6.1 E_TWOACK Model 
E_TWOACK is an abbreviation of Enhanced TWOACK, where it works as the 
famous TWOACK mechanism except that we improve it by adding a mechanism to 
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detect the malicious nodes rather than links. As we have discussed in the previous 
chapter, one of the disadvantages of the TWOACK scheme is that it detects a 
misbehaving links instead of detecting the misbehaving nodes, and that will give the 
malicious node more chance to drop more data packets, for example, suppose N1 is a 
malicious node and it has many links in the network, e.g. it is exist in path1 (S->N0->N1-
>N2->D) and in path2 (S->N4->N1->N3->D). In this example, the TWOACK 
mechanism reports N0->N1 and N4-N1 as misbehaving links, and each one of them will 
be considered as a different entry to the misbehaving links data base; thereby, each link 
has a chance to drop packets until it reaches the specified threshold, that will double the 
total dropped packets by malicious node N1. Furthermore, there would be many links in 
the network that contains N1 as one of its ends, and that will increase the dropped packets 
much more.  
For that reason, in our mechanism, we improve the procedure of the TWOACK to 
make it more accurate in the detection of malicious nodes. All intrusion detection systems 
that have been proposed assume that the malicious node exists at the intermediate nodes; 
thereby, we all agree that it will not be a destination node. In our proposed solution, we 
use this assumption to determine the misbehaving node in the links that have a 
destination node in the other end, e.g. N1->D.  
S F2 DF4F3F1
 
Figure ‎3-11: Example of the three types of nodes in the routing path (Source, Forwarder, 
and Destination) 
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 Figure 3.8 explores a general example of a path from source to destination in the 
source route.  There are four possibilities of the three consecutive nodes along the path. 
These possibilities are as follows:  
 Case 1: S-F1-D ( source then forwarder then destination) 
 Case 2: F1-F2-D (forwarder then forwarder then destination) 
 Case 3: S-F1-F2 (source then forwarder then forwarder)  
 Case 4: F1-F2-F3 (forwarder then forwarder then destination)  
In the regular TWOACK mechanism, the first node in the four cases, which is S 
or F1, will report that F1-D, F2-D, F2-F3, and F1-F2 links respectively are malicious 
links.   Unlike the TWOACK mechanism, E-TWOACK will detect the exact malicious 
nodes as follows: 
 In the first two cases, the first node, which is S in (S-F1-D) or F in (F1-F2-D), 
will report that the node just before the destination is a malicious node. For 
example in case one F1 and in case 2 F2 will be reported as a malicious node.  
 In case three, S-F1-F2, suppose F1 is the malicious node then S will know that 
because there will be no acknowledgment or alarm received by S. on the other 
hand, if F2 is the malicious node F1 will send alarm to S then S will detect that 
F2 is the malicious node.  
 In case four, node F3 will be reported as a malicious node by F1. That is because 
the node before F1, which is could be F0 or S, has reported that the link F1->F2 
is a good link because it has received TWOACK packets from F2; thereby, F3 is 
the one who drops the packets.  
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The E-TWOACK has the same data structure, shown in figure 3.9, as TWOACK 
except that there will be no second hop. Likewise TWOACK, each misbehaving 
node will have the misbehaving counter, CMIS, that will be increased each time 
timeout occurs, and if this CMIS exceeds the specified threshold, the misbehaving 
node will be considered as a malicious node and an alarm will be send to the source 
node.  
3.6.2 Aack Model  
In this section we describe the second part of the complete IDS AACK, which has 
same name as the complete system. Aack is an end to end acknowledgment based 
scheme. We distinguish it from the complete system by writing the ACK in small letters, 
e.i., Aack.   
In this scheme all the intermediate nodes work regularly without any change in 
their functionality. This appears an important advantage of our mechanism where the 
intermediate nodes will not consume their power and memory all the time, and these two 
resources (power and memory) are very important and scarce resources in MANETs, as 
we have discussed in the first chapter. In this scheme, the source and destination work 
with each other to ensure delivery of data packets. The destination will acknowledge each 
received data packet with Aack acknowledgment that will extract its route from source to 
destination from the source route of received data packet. 
That means we have two types of acknowledgment packets in our mechanism: 
 Aack: This is from source to destination acknowledgment, in AACK mode. 
 TWOACK: This is between each three consecutive nodes, in the TACK mode. 
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Thus, the Aack acknowledgment will travel in the opposite direction of the data flow 
to the source node. This process continues until a timeout happens at source. The 
timeout (at source node) is calculated as in equation 3.1, it is not a fixed value. It 
depends on the number of hops in the path and the Tack mode timeout.  
 
 
 
 Tack timeout is determined experimentally, and more details about it will be 
described in the next chapter. Because the Tack timeout takes in account a number of two 
hops, we divide it by 2 to get the timeout of one hop transmission, which is a constant 
value whereas the no. of hops is a variable value.  
When timeout occurs, the source uses the switching system, as described before in 
this chapter, to switch from Aack mode to Tack mode. Where in this mode will work as 
the TWOACK mechanism until it detects a misbehaving node or discovers that it was an 
error, by the arrival of a data packet of type TA, Tack mode, to the destination. If TA data 
packet arrives to the destination, that means there is no misbehaving node in the path 
from source to a destination. Therefore, the destination will send a special packet named 
a switch, which tells the source to come back again to an Aack mode, and so on. If there 
is a malicious node, it will be detected as described in the E-TWOACK section.  
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3.7 Response System Model    
When the misbehaving node is discovered by the detection system, the response 
system will be triggered by the same node that detects the misbehaving node. All nodes 
in the network are capable of doing detection and response functions. And all nodes have 
an array to register the good and bad nodes based on the behavior of that node in the 
network.  
When the node discovers a malicious node it will inform the source node by 
sending an alarm, which is a small packet that is generated by the routing protocol and 
extract the route from the source route of the data packet. This alarm will carry the 
malicious node id. Each node in the path will forward the alarm and learn from it about 
the malicious nodes. Furthermore, they will add the source node of the alarm as a good 
node in their data base. In addition, all nodes that will overhear the alarm will learn from 
it about the malicious and good nodes.  
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4 METHODOLOGY AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
In this chapter we describe our methodology that we follow to evaluate AACK 
mechanism. We evaluate our proposed mechanism by means of simulation. A brief 
description for network simulator NS2 that we have used in our simulation is given in 
this chapter. This chapter includes two main sections; the first is the simulation 
environment, and the second is the results analysis.  
4.1 Simulation Environment 
One of the main challenges of this research was the NS2 simulator with its complex 
interface. NS2 version 2.33 was used with fedora 8 Linux platform and desktop computer 
with Pentium 4 CPU with speed of 3.8 MHZ and 1 Giga RAM. This version does not 
supported with video traffic; that takes us more time to search for contributions of NS 
users to add video traffic to the NS simulator. Two main contributions that we have used; 
one of Dr. Ashraf Mattrawy [Mattrawy 2002], and the other was for Chih Heng [Chih 
2007]. Also, we used some scripts from Evalvid-RA [Lie 2007]. 
4.1.1 Simulator Description 
We use Network Simulator-2 (NS-2) version 2.33 in our simulations because it is 
more flexible to change its internal files, open source, and free. For that reasons, it is 
considered a good simulation tool for researchers; it is the most popular simulator used 
by the mobile ad hoc network researchers [Kurkowski 2005], see figure 4.1 that shows  a 
survey of simulation-based papers in ACM’s international Symposium on Mobile Ad 
Hoc networking and computing (MobiHoc) 2000-2004. Until now it depends on the 
contributions of the researchers. A good brief description for NS2 will be found in 
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[Palaniappan 2005] and for more details it will be found in the NS2 full documentation in 
[Fall 2003]. The simulator is written using two object-oriented languages, C++ and OTcl. 
The C++ compiled components run the core simulation engine, event schedulers and 
agents. The OTcl based interpreter is used to setup the simulation configuration and 
controls of the C++ data path.  
The dual design benefits from the execution speed of the C++ compiled network 
objects and rapid reconfigure-ability of interpreted OTcl configuration objects. Most 
often in simulation studies the parameters change with every new simulation, but the 
underlying protocols and data agents remain the same. Therefore, it is useful to have a 
rapidly reconfigurable simulator as the basis for using the dual interpreter/compiled class 
hierarchy. Since OTcl are interpreted changes in simulation parameters do not have to be 
recompiled, a researcher can run large sets of simulation with a one-time compilation of 
the C++ network objects. The control parameters and functions of the C++ compiled 
objects are exposed to the OTcl interpreter via OTcl linkage. For every OTcl object 
invoked in the interpreter hierarchy there is a mirrored object created in the C++ 
hierarchy. NS2 can be downloaded from [NS].  
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Figure ‎4-1: Simulator usage survey of simulation-based papers in ACM's International 
Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc) 2000-2004 
[Kurkowski 2005]. 
 
4.1.2 Simulation Scenarios 
AACK mechanism is examined under different conditions. We change the 
mobility speed and traffic parameters to get different scenarios. High and low mobility 
simulations are conducted with two types of traffic, which are the constant bit rate and 
video traffic. The two mobility speeds are 1 meter/second and 20 meter/ second, these 
two speeds represent the pedestrian and car motions. 50 mobile nodes are deployed over 
space area of 670 X 670 meter square. These mobile nodes classified to three categories: 
 Normal nodes: these nodes do regular operations including the IDS in the case 
of the IDS mechanism.  
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 Attacker nodes: these nodes apply the regular attack model that just dropping 
data packets. 
 Smart attacker nodes: they do the same functions of the attacker nodes with 
the ability to cheat the monitor by using power control and intended collisions 
with its next hop, as described in the previous chapter. 
In all scenarios the three categories are exist in different percentages. The number 
of attackers varies from 0 % to 40 % from the total number of nodes, which are 50 nodes. 
Smart attackers form 40% from the total number of attackers. The number of runs was 10 
run per one data point and the average is taken. Each run has different mobility scenario, 
that means different initial positions and different destination locations, and different seed 
number, the seed number in NS2 is a variable that change the random variables that is 
generated and used in each run. Figure 4.1 shows an example of one random initial 
mobility scenario.  
The traffic that we have used in our simulation can be classified into two types: 
low traffic (CBR) and high traffic (Video). In video traffic we build a small scenario of 5 
nodes to examine performance of video transmission of both types MPEG4 and H.264 
over DSR routing protocol to see the performance of the protocol during both types of 
video traffic. Then based on the results we use the MPEG4 to evaluate our mechanism. 
The video traffic is evaluated over high mobility and 30 mobile nodes.  
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Figure ‎4-2: Initial Simulation Grid 
4.1.3  Simulation Parameters 
Table 4.1 shows the simulation parameters of DSR routing protocol that is used in our 
simulations. Other simulation parameters setting are shown in table 4.2.  
Table ‎4-1: DSR simulation parameters 
Parameter Value 
DSR snoop forwarder errors ON 
DSR snoop source routs ON 
DSR salvage with cache  ON 
DSR use Tap (promiscuous mode) ON 
DSR reply from cache to RREQ ON 
Max. time between RREQs 10 sec 
How long a packet can live in send buffer 30 sec 
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Table ‎4-2: Other Simulation Parameters 
Parameter Value 
Number of nodes 50 nodes 
Simulation area 670 meter X 670 meter 
Simulation time 900 second 
Mobility model  Random waypoint with pause time 0  
Speed rang  Uniformly distributed (0.1-20) meter/second 
Maximum speed 1 (low mobility) and 20 ( high mobility)  
Traffic type CBR MPEG4 
Packet size 512 bytes Variable (Max, 1028B) 
Packet rate 4/sec 30 frame / second 
Maximum connections 10 8 
Propagation model Two-ray ground model 
Antenna model  Omni-directional  
Transmission range 250 meter 
MAC protocol  802.11 CSMA/CA 
Link Bandwidth 2 Mbps 
Routing protocol  Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 
Watchdog  timeout  0.1 sec  
Watchdog, TOWACK threshold 40 packets 
AACK threshold 30 Packets  
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The timeout is a very important parameter and its value affects the efficiency of the 
detection system. That is because if it is very large it will give the misbehaving node 
more chance to drop packets before detection. On the other hand, if it is very small it will 
increase the false alarms, which degrade the performance significantly. In our study, we 
have three mechanisms to evaluate: the watchdog, TWOACK, and AACK. Watchdog 
overhear the next hop node to acknowledge that it has forwarded the packet, which 
means that its timeout is just considered for one hop away (one RTT, Round Trip Time 
the time from sending packet to receiving acknowledgment). Whereas in case of 
TWOACK it needs to acknowledge the receiving of data packet at node that is two hops 
away, which means it is time out bigger than in watchdog. Unlike watchdog and 
TWOACK, they have a constant timeout value, AACK mechanism has a variable timeout 
value because it has a random value of number of hops. That means, it depends on the 
number of hops in the path from source to destination. Parameters could be changing 
during simulations depend on the scenarios used.  
Time out is calculated as follows:  
Watchdog needs just round trip time (RTT) of one hop, which is specified 
experimentally by taken the average value of the time from the data packet sending time 
to the time when watchdog overhears the forwarding of the same packet. As presented in 
table 4.2, it was set to be 0.10 second. In TWOACK scheme, the packet needs to be 
acknowledged from the node that is two hops away from the sender.  Similar to 
watchdog, it is determined experimentally. The period of time from sending a data packet 
to receiving the acknowledgment of the same data packet is determined experimentally 
and the average value is taken. It was set to 0.2 second. 
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The AACK timeout is variable; it depends on number of hops and the value of TWACK 
timeout. It is calculated dynamically during the simulation run using the equation 4.1. 
  (4.1) 
4.1.4 Performance Metrics 
Three performance metrics are used to evaluate AACK, Watchdog, and TWOACK 
schemes. They can be defined as follows: 
 Packet delivery ratio (PDR): it is the ratio of the total number of received packets 
at the destination to the total number of sent packets by the source. 
 
 Routing Overhead (RoH): this is the ratio of routing-related packets in bytes 
(RREQ, RREP, RERR, AACK, TWACK, alarms, and Switch) to the total 
routing and data transmissions (sent or forwarded packets) in a simulation in 
bytes. That means the acknowledgments, alarms and switching over head is 
included. 
 
 Average end-to-end delay (AED): the end-to-end average delay for all 
successfully received packets at the destination. It is calculated for each data 
packet by subtracts the sending time of it from the received time at final 
destination. Then the average represents the AED.  
 
N.B:  N is the number of successfully received packets. 
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In video traffic evaluation we have added one performance metric, which is the end 
to end delay versus number of hops. That is calculated by taken the average value of end 
to end delay for each grope of packets in which the all sent packets will be classified into 
several gropes based on number of hops it takes to reach the destination. 
PSNR (Peak Signal to Noise Ratio) is a performance metric that is used to compare 
the two codec compression techniques, MPEG4 and H.264. It measures the error between 
a reconstructed image and the original one.  ITU-R introduced quality metric called mean 
opinion score (MOS), shown in table 4.3. The MOS values varying from 1 (bad) to 5 
(excellent) and it depends on the peak-signal-to-noise ratio that is calculated using Eq. 
(4.5) [ITU 1991, Symes 2001]. 
 
 
 
Where Yref(i,j) and YPrc(i,j) are the pixel value of the reference and reconstructed frames, 
respectively. The total number of pixels in a frame are represented by N, where Vpeak = 
2
k
-1 and k = number of bits per pixel (luminance component). PSNR calculates the error 
between a reconstructed image and the original one. Mapping between PSNR values and 
MOS is used to recognize the quality of video stream as a human visual system [Chee 
2007]. Thus, based on the PSNR value of the frame it will be classified into bad, poor, 
fair, good, or excellent depends on the table 4.3.  
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Table ‎4-3: PSNR to MOS mapping 
PSNR [dB] MOS value Class 
≥ 37 5 Excellent 
31-37 4 Good 
25-31 3 Fair 
20-25 2 Poor 
<20 1 Bad 
 
4.2 Simulation Results 
The simulation results are two main parts: the CBR and video traffic. In the CBR 
traffic there are two mobility scenarios. In the video traffic there are the comparison 
results of MPEG4 and H.264 video types; and the MPEG4 results that is used to evaluate 
AACK versus original DSR and TWOACK.  
4.2.1 CBR Results 
In each part, low and high speed, we separate the results into two categorize. The 
first one shows only the results of AACK and TWOACK mechanisms, to make the 
comparison of the results easier. Then the second part will include all four schemes DSR, 
Watchdog, TWOACK, and AACK, to compare the acknowledgment mechanisms with 
the DSR, and watchdog.  
4.2.1.1 Low Speed 
The network is more stable and dropping packets due to network errors is very 
low. Thus, both mechanisms AACK and TWOACK expected to be efficient intrusion 
detection systems. They outperform both DSR and Watchdog by around 25% in the 
packet delivery ratio, as shown on figure 4.4 (packet delivery ratio). Figure 4.3 clarify the 
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different performance of the AACK and TWOACK in terms of packet delivery ration, 
routing overhead, and end to end delay. As it is illustrated, in case of small number of 
malicious nodes, in PDR, the AACK slightly outperform the TWOACK, whereas in case 
of large number of misbehaving nodes (30% and 40 %) the performance of AACK is 
better than TWOACK by approximately 6%.  In average the routing overhead of AACK 
is less than TWOACK due to the reduction of the TWOACK packets that will not work 
all the time as discussed before. The end-to-end delay of AACK is less because it reduces 
also the computation time of the intermediate nodes. the routing overhead of both AACK 
and TWOACK increases with the increasing of misbehaving nodes that is because of the 
high detection rate that will increase the routing discovery phases that increases the 
RREQ broadcasts which increase the routing overhead.  
 
Figure ‎4-3: Low speed results of AACK and TWOACK comparison 
 
-     - 
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In figure 4.4, we add the DSR and Watchdog to compare their performance to the 
acknowledgment based mechanisms, AACK and TWOACK. PDR of the 
acknowledgment based mechanisms outperform the DSR and Watchdog approximately 
by 25 % while this cost it about 10 % overhead. Because of the partial detection of 
watchdog, just detects the regular attackers, it outperform the DSR by 5 %. The overhead 
of DSR and watchdog is almost the same because the detection mechanism of the 
watchdog depends on overhearing, which just consume more power and computation 
time; thereby, there is no additional control packets used for detection system, e.g. 
acknowledgments. Also, notes that the end to end delay of the DSR and Watchdog 
decreases while the misbehaving nodes increases that is because the misbehaving nodes 
cover the network errors such as broken links this will fool the source that the path is 
working well so the shortest paths still works and there will be no longer paths that 
increase the end to end delay. Furthermore, the packets that are dropped are not included 
in the calculation of the end to end delay.  
The end to end delay of the TWOACK is the largest. That is because it has the 
TWOACK packets that increases the collisions due to it is opposite direction to the data 
flow and also due to the computation time of the detection system in all the nodes along 
the path.   
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Figure ‎4-4: Low speed results of the four schemes DSR, WD, TWOACK, and AACK 
 
4.2.1.2 High Speed 
Due to the effective detection of misbehaving nodes in AACK rather than 
misbehaving links in TWOACK, and also due to the less overhead acknowledgment 
packets the AACK outperforms the TWOACK in high speed scenario by approximately 
15 % in case of the 0% to 30% of misbehaving nodes in the network; but in case of 40 % 
the TWOACK has better performance that AACK that is could be because the switching 
overhead of AACK. Because the broken link rate is high in the high speed scenarios, thus 
the AACK will keep switching between AACK and TWOACK every time it encounters a 
broken like error that will increase the switching overhead packets, and that also explain 
_   _ 
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the increasing of the overhead of AACK in the routing overhead result (in case of 40% 
misbehaving  nodes).  
 
Figure ‎4-5: High speed results of AACK and TWOACK comparison 
In figure 4.6, the PDR of the four schemes at 0% misbehaving nodes it is more 
clear hear than in the case of low mobility that the DSR and Watchdog outperforms the 
acknowledgment-based schemes due to that they have more overhead especially with the 
overhead of high mobility which increases the broken links rate. the overhead of the 
acknowledgment based schemes here is more than in case of low mobility by about 10 %; 
thereby, as the figure illustrates it is larger than the overhead of watchdog and DSR by 
approximately 25 % while the increasing in the performance about 10 %. That means the 
benefits of the acknowledgment-based schemes is more beneficial in cases of low 
mobility scenarios. The end-to-end delay of the TWOACK and AACK on average is 
_   _ 
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almost the same because in high mobility as we have mentioned before the overhead of 
the switching scheme add more computation time. 
 
 
Figure ‎4-6: High speed results of the four schemes DSR, WD, TWOACK, and AACK 
_   _ 
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Figure ‎4-7: Node detection enhancement 
 
Figure 4-7 shows the effect of the detection efficiency of TWOACK by applying 
node detection instead of link detection. AA-N curve indicates the Adaptive ACK with 
node detection and AA-L indicates Adaptive ACK with link detection. The AACK with 
node detection outperforms both TWOACK and AACK with link detection because it 
detects the exact misbehaving node. Whereas the TWOACK and AACK with link 
detection are closed to each other because in high mobility the switching overhead is high 
and the TACK mode is working most of the time. 
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4.2.2 Video Results 
We use the video traffic to apply our new mechanism on real applications. To our 
best of knowledge, and throughout the literature review, this is the first time to apply 
video traffic over intrusion detection systems over MANETs.   
4.2.2.1 MPEG4 and H.264 Comparison 
A small experiment is conducted to examine the MPEG4 and H.264 using to see 
what is more appropriate for examining DSR routing protocol in NS-2, for purpose of 
using it in our simulations. This simulation includes 5 stationary nodes distributed around 
space area of 500 meter X 500 meter. Frame rate was 30 frames per second and each 
frame will be fragmented into 1000 bytes for transmission. (Maximum packet length will 
be 1028 bytes, including IP header (20bytes) and UDP header (8bytes)). 
The foreman pictures in figure 4.3 include three types of frame groups: the 
MPEG4 output frames that is decoded and received at destination, the original frames 
that is sent by the source, and the H.264 frames that is also decoded and received at 
destination. From those pictures we can note that the quality of MPEG4 is better than 
H.264. Furthermore, the result shown on figure 4.4, the PSNR values of MPEG4 and 
H.264, could be explained to be more understood by using table 4.3 to map the results 
into the equivalent MOS value. We conclude that on average the MOS value for MPEG4 
is good whereas in case of H.264 it is fair. Thus, the MPEG 4 is more suitable for our 
simulations than H.264, which is because it gives better results in terms of quality and 
PSNR. 
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Figure ‎4-8: The frames quality comparison of MPEG and H.264 
 
 
Figure ‎4-9: PSNR graph 
We use the MPEG4 video generator that is based on TES model [Mattrawy2002], 
which was the more flexible for our scenarios. In video scenarios, we use 30 nodes with 
high mobility (pause time = 0, and speed = 20 meter/sec), the grid is the same as in the 
CBR traffic, 670 x 670 m
2
.  The video traffic experiment lasts 200 sec. The simulation 
time is less than in CBR scenarios, because the video traffic generators in NS-2 simulator 
are still not supported by developers. All what is used until this date are just contributions 
from others and these contributions still do some exception and segmentation errors. That 
is why we reduce the simulation time of video traffic to 200 sec.  
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4.2.2.2 MPEG4 Results 
In figure 4.10, DSR has a PDR value around 35 percentage when there are no 
misbehaving nodes, that is because we used the worst scenario in the video traffic, where 
it has high mobiltiy, with pause time of 0 and uniformally distributed speed 1-20 
meter/sec, and high traffic load with 30 frame/sec. whereas in [Pandian 2006], the 
corresponding value for DSR was around 50 % because it has less number of nodes, 20 
nodes, and less traffic  load which is 4-10 packet/sec. the AACK outperform the DSR and 
TWOACK in persence of misbehabing nodes by approximately 2% the performance 
enhancement here is the lowest because it is high mobility with high traffic load. Note the 
routing overhead in figure 4.11. In the high speed of CBR the TWOACK reaches around 
40% routing overhead and AACK reaches around 30 %, whereas here in case of video 
traffic the overhead is much less than in case of CBR.  
 
Figure ‎4-10: Packet Delivery Ratio of MPEG4 over DSR with Misbehaving Nodes 
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The routing overhead in this case for the TWOACK on average 4 % and for 
AACK it is almost the same, this is because the traffic here is larger than in CBR where it 
is 4 packet per second in case of CBR and here in case of video traffic it is 30 frame per 
second and each frame could be fragmented to number of packets. According to the 
equation of 4.3 the larger data traffic results in smaller routing overhead. So the effect of 
increasing the control packets, routing packets, will not be clear in case of huge data 
traffic especially here with small simulation time period.   
 
Figure ‎4-11: Routing overhead of MPEG4 traffic 
 
The last figure, Figure 4.12, has the number of hops in the x axis and the end to 
end delay in y axis. Normally, it shows that the DSR is the best. Furthermor, it illustrates 
that all the three mechanisms have almost the same end to end delay for the transmissions 
of  one hop, that is because the AACK and TWOACK schemes do not use any 
acknowledgments for transmissions of one hop. Also, it shows that both mechnisms have  
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Figure ‎4-12: End-to-end delay per number of hops 
  
 the same delay for 2 hops transmissions, that is because the AACK works as TWOACK 
for transmissions of 2 hops. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This chapter summarizes of the whole of this research, reviews the research 
contributions, and discusses the important future work.  
5.1 Conclusions 
Intended packet dropping misbehaving could be done by selfish or malicious 
nodes. This research is devoted to detect and mitigate those misbehaving nodes by 
avoiding them in later transmissions. In this research we continuo the improvement of the 
existing IDSs over MANETs, exactly we solve some problems of Watchdog technique, 
which considered to be the base technique that is used by many of the recently IDSs. 
Receiver collision and limited power transmission are the two main problems that we 
focused on to solve in this research. AACK is the proposed IDS, which is an abbreviation 
for Adaptive ACKnowledgments. AACK is compared to the existing IDS TWOACK to 
evaluate its performance. The results show that AACK outperforms TWOACK in terms 
of packet delivery ration and routing overhead in low and high mobility scenarios. Video 
traffic is used to evaluate AACK IDS, for our best of knowledge this is the first attempt 
to evaluate IDS with video traffic, the results also shows that AACK is better than 
TWOACK. 
NS-2 is used to conduct our simulations, and we have modified the original DSR 
protocol to implement the packet dropping attack and the IDSs. This research has several 
contributions that will be summarized as follows: 
 Studied the effect of intended packet dropping misbehavior on mobile ad hoc 
networks using simulations. 
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 Proposed new IDS for MANETs, which solve the two problems of watchdog 
technique, receiver collision and limited power transmission, and improves the 
performance of existing mechanisms (TWOACK and Watchdog). 
 Compared intrusion detection mechanisms in various wireless scenarios  
 Examining the MPEG4 and H.246 video traffic over DSR routing protocol. 
 Examining video traffic over intrusion detection systems in MANETs. 
The implementation of intrusion detection systems over MANETs is not easy 
especially when it works in high mobility or high traffic load scenarios. It needs to be 
adaptive to any changes in the network either speed or traffic. I suggest making the 
timeout and thresholds parameters adaptive to make the IDS more efficient. 
The AACK mechanism has some limitations, such as that it could not work will in 
long paths that will take a significant time for the end to end acknowledgments to be 
applied. This will give the misbehaving nodes more time for dropping more packets. Also 
still suffer from the partial dropping attacks (gray hole attacks).  
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5.2 Future work   
 In our future work, AACK will be evaluated in more complicated scenarios such 
as 100 mobile nodes. Furthermore, we planned to adapt it to work with other 
MANET routing protocols, not just over DSR. One of the important future works 
is to study MANET IDS performance under other popular routing protocols (both 
reactive and proactive). 
 
 This scheme can be used to solve other problems of watchdog like partial 
dropping or colluding, where two nodes cooperate to do the misbehaving. We are 
looking for improving AACK to detect the gray hole attacks, which adapt their 
dropping rates to the IDS’ threshold.  
 
 Because most of the previous IDSs mechanisms uses watchdog, we argue that 
AACK scheme is the most power aware intrusion detection mechanism. That is 
because it does not use watchdog that uses overhearing, which consume large 
amount of power. Also, TWOACK does not use watchdog but still consume more 
power in computations. One of the more important issues of our future work is to 
evaluate AACK with taken in our consideration the power consumption 
performance metric.  
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APPENDIX A - Pseudo code of the AACK scheme 
 
A. Source Node 
//initialization at the sender node  
Cmis (for all Nodes) =0 //all nodes start as well-behaving node  
 Nmode=AA //initialization mode (default mode AACK) 
While (current time < simulation time) do  
If (data PKT sent) then    //PKT == packet 
 If (Nmode== AA) then PKTtype = AA    // Mark data PKT as TACK PKT 
 Else  PKTtype = AA  //Mark data PKT as AACK PKT 
LIST PKT_ID, PKTtype, Ts   // insert PKT ID, PKT type and sending time into 
LIST 
End 
If (AACK OR TACK PKT received) then //Acknowledgment received  
Search LIST for PKT_ID carried by AACK or TACK 
If (found) then   
 LISTPKT_ID   // remove PKT record (PKT_ID, PKTtype, Ts) from LIST 
88 
 
End  
If (timeout event happens) then   // AACK or TACK is not received for PKT_ID 
 If (PKTtype= AA) then 
 Begin  
 Nmode=TA //switch node mode to Twoack 
LISTPKT_ID   // remove PKT record (PKT_ID, PKTtype, Ts) from LIST 
End 
If (PKTtype =TA) then 
LISTPKT_ID   // remove PKT record (PKT_ID,PKTtype, Ts) from LIST 
 Cmis++ //increase the misbehavior counter of the link 
 If (Cmis >Thmis) then Report misbehavior link // misbehavior counter exceeds 
predefined threshold 
 End 
End  
If (switch PKT received) then  
Nmode=AA // switch node mode to AACK 
End 
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B. Forwarder Node 
While (current time < simulation time) do  
If (data PKT received) then 
 If (PKTtype = AA) then   just forward // current mode is AACK 
 Else    // current mode is TWOACK  
Begin  
LIST PKT_ID, Ts   // insert PKT ID and sending time into LIST 
Send (TWOACK PKT) // to 2 hops before  
End  
If (TACK PKT received) then 
 Do same as sender 
If (timeout event happens) then   
 Do same as sender when (PKTtype =TA) 
End 
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C. Receiver Node: 
While (current time < simulation time) do  
If (data PKT received) then 
 If (PKTtype = AA) then 
 Send (AACK PKT)  //to Sender  
 Else      
Send (Switch PKT)   // to Sender  
End 
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Appendix B – Results Tables 
A. CBR TRAFFIC 
 
  
DSR- Low Speed 
 
      MN % 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
PDR 0.99858 0.81194 0.74692 0.70356 0.66637 
RoH(PKT) 0.01476 0.01228 0.01139 0.01008 0.00941 
RoH(Byt) 0.00296 0.00246 0.00231 0.00205 0.00192 
E-E delay 0.01455 0.01197 0.01078 0.01023 0.00976 
       
  
DSR High Speed 
 
      MN % 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
PDR 0.99581 0.71002 0.62483 0.56137 0.52591 
RoH(PKT) 0.11478 0.0762 0.05666 0.04795 0.03986 
RoH(Byt) 0.02321 0.01477 0.01083 0.00931 0.00781 
E-E delay 0.02884 0.01565 0.01235 0.01053 0.0094 
       
 
  
Watchdog  Low Speed 
  
      MN% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
PDR 0.99853 0.87657 0.81362 0.76199 0.6941 
RoH(PKT) 0.03639 0.01241 0.01473 0.01892 0.00976 
RoH(Byt) 0.00723 0.00246 0.00292 0.00372 0.00196 
E-E delay 0.01752 0.01291 0.01221 0.01189 0.01033 
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Watchdog  High Speed 
 
      MN% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
PDR 0.99581 0.71928 0.64693 0.58548 0.55108 
RoH(PKT) 0.11478 0.08468 0.06321 0.05755 0.04279 
RoH(Byt) 0.02321 0.01657 0.01216 0.011 0.00816 
E-E delay 0.02884 0.01584 0.01307 0.01153 0.0098 
 
 
 
  
TWOACK  Low Speed 
 
      MN% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
PDR 0.99579 0.98328 0.97541 0.90383 0.89024 
RoH(PKT) 0.46366 0.47112 0.45274 0.50388 0.49534 
RoH(Byt) 0.11829 0.12334 0.11317 0.16532 0.16 
E-E delay 0.0196 0.01997 0.0189 0.01874 0.01807 
 
 
 
  
TWOACK  High Speed 
 
      MN% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
PDR 0.71913 0.68576 0.67825 0.5967 0.66051 
RoH(PKT) 0.72185 0.71132 0.70397 0.74042 0.6175 
RoH(Byt) 0.38686 0.38097 0.35651 0.40974 0.28179 
E-E delay 0.05674 0.05206 0.0491 0.04325 0.03449 
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AACK-Link Detection LS 
  
      MN% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
PDR 0.99871 0.98639 0.978244 0.96159 0.95211 
RoH(PKT) 0.42111 0.43796 0.43659 0.45333 0.47407 
RoH(Byt) 0.10159 0.10891 0.10735 0.11776 0.12751 
E-E delay 0.018 0.01809 0.01698 0.01824 0.01748 
 
 
 
  
AACK-Link Detection HS 
  
      MN% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
PDR 0.71856 0.70368 0.67344 0.58466 0.57608 
RoH(PKT) 0.73027 0.71823 0.72114 0.75383 0.76127 
RoH(Byt) 0.38832 0.37872 0.37744 0.43513 0.41952 
E-E delay 0.06424 0.05746 0.05456 0.04238 0.04363 
 
 
 
  
AACK-Node Detection LS 
 
      MN% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
PDR 0.99843 0.99031 0.9774 0.96159 0.94931 
RoH(PKT) 0.42122 0.43381 0.44069 0.45333 0.45226 
RoH(Byt) 0.10197 0.10676 0.10895 0.11776 0.11846 
E-E delay 0.01792 0.01828 0.01774 0.01824 0.01659 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
 
 
  
AACK-Node Detection HS 
 
      MN% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
PDR 0.94162 0.79437 0.73118 0.72413 0.6223 
RoH(PKT) 0.59009 0.63562 0.63159 0.59814 0.62961 
RoH(Byt) 0.20876 0.27281 0.28959 0.23973 0.28983 
E-E delay 0.06543 0.05691 0.04897 0.03301 0.03076 
 
B.  VIDEO TRAFFIC 
 
 
   
DSR 
  
      MN % 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
PDR 0.34001 0.31061 0.30439 0.29683 0.28492 
ROH 0.0681 0.02774 0.0247 0.02391 0.01818 
ROH 0.01108 0.00421 0.00371 0.00366 0.00275 
E-E delay 0.18787 0.20515 0.2402 0.22247 0.2051 
 
 
 
   
TWOACK 
  
      MN% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
PDR 0.33765 0.31212 0.31772 0.31137 0.28995 
ROH 0.27552 0.2549 0.24187 0.22758 0.21779 
ROH 0.04921 0.04292 0.03963 0.03728 0.03415 
E-E Delay 0.21959 0.22306 0.24031 0.25743 0.28402 
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AACK 
  
      MN% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
PDR 0.33063 0.32343 0.31542 0.32052 0.31404 
ROH 0.26102 0.24884 0.23544 0.21832 0.19442 
ROH 0.04573 0.04198 0.03864 0.03439 0.03107 
E-E Delay 0.21782 0.21185 0.20885 0.221 0.22427 
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